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Abstract— Programmers of relational database applications 
use software solutions (Hibernate, JDBC, LINQ, ADO.NET) to 
ease the development process of business tiers. These software 
solutions were not devised to address access control policies, 
much less for evolving access control policies, in spite of their 
unavoidable relevance. Currently, access control policies, 
whenever implemented, are enforced by independent 
components leading to a separation between policies and their 
enforcement. This paper proposes a new approach based on an 
architectural model referred to here as the Access Control-
driven Architecture with Dynamic Adaptation (ACADA).  
Solutions based on ACADA are automatically built to statically 
enforce access control policies based on schemas of Create, 
Read, Update and Delete (CRUD) expressions. Then, CRUD 
expressions are dynamically deployed at runtime driven by 
established access control policies. Any update in the policies is 
followed by an adaptation process to keep access control 
mechanisms aligned with the policies to be enforced. A proof of 
concept based on Java and Java Database Connectivity 
(JDBC) is also presented. 
Keywords-access control;software architecture; adaptive 
systems. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Software systems have increasingly played a key role in 
all dimensions of our existence as humans, such as transport 
operators, financial movements, e-health, e-governance and 
national/international security.  They are responsible for 
managing sensitive data that needs to be kept secure from 
unauthorized usage. Access control policies (ACP) are a 
critical aspect of security. ACP are aimed at preventing 
unauthorized access to sensitive data and is usually 
implemented in a three phase approach [1]: security policy 
definition; security model to be followed; and, finally, 
security enforcement mechanism. Security policies define 
rules through which access control is governed. The four 
main strategies for regulating access control policies are [2, 
3]: discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access 
control (MAC), Role-based access control (RBAC) and 
credential-based access control. Security models provide 
formal representations [4-8] for security policies. Security 
enforcement mechanisms implement the security policy 
formalized by the security model. ACP exist to keep 
sensitive data safe, mostly kept and managed by database 
management systems. Among the several paradigms, the 
relational database management systems (RDBMS) continue 
to be one of the most successful one to manage data and, 
therefore, to build database applications. Beyond RDBMS, 
software architects use other current software solutions 
(CuSS), such as JDBC [9], ODBC [10], JPA [11], LINQ 
[12], Hibernate [13], ADO.NET [14] and Ruby on Rails [15] 
to ease the development process of business tiers of database 
applications. Unfortunately, CuSS were devised to tackle the 
impedance mismatch issue [16], leaving ACP out of their 
scope. Current mechanisms to enforce ACP to data residing 
in a RDBMS consist of designing a separate security layer, 
following one of two different approaches: traditional and 
PEP-PDP: 
1) The traditional approach is based on a security 
software layer developed by security experts using RDBMS 
tools. ACP architecture vary from RDBMS to RDBMS but 
comprise several entities, such as users, roles, database 
schemas and permissions. They are directly managed by 
RDBMS and are completely transparent to applications. 
Their presence is only noticed if some unauthorized access is 
detected. Basically, before being executed, SQL statements 
are evaluated by RDBMS to check their compliance with the 
established ACP. If any violation is detected, SQL 
statements are rejected, otherwise they are executed. 
2) The PEP-PDP approach consists in a security software 
layer with two main functionalities: the policy decision point 
(PDP) and the policy enforcement point (PEP), as defined in 
XACML [17] and used in [18], see Figure 1.  The PEP 
intercepts users requests for accessing a resource protected 
by an ACP (Figure 1, 1) and enforces the decision to be 
performed by PDP on this access authorization. PDP 
evaluates requests to access a resource against the ACP to 
decide whether to grant or to deny the access (Figure 1, 2). If 
authorization is granted, the action is sent by the PEP to 
RDBMS to be executed (Figure 1, 3)  and, if no other   
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Figure 1. PEP-PDP approach. 
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access control exists, the action is executed by the RDBMS 
(Figure 1, 4). PDPs are designed and configured by security 
experts and exist as independent components. PEPs are 
intentionally inserted in key points of the source code to 
enforce PDP decisions. 
Both approaches impose a sharp separation between ACP 
and the mechanisms responsible for their enforcement. This 
fragility is also apparent in CuSS: security layers exist to 
enforce ACP and CuSS exist to ease the development 
process of database applications. This separation of roles 
entails four important drawbacks regarding the usage of 
current CuSS: 
 1) For programmers who use CuSS, this separation 
demands a complete mastering on the established ACP and 
on their dependency on database schemas. This mastering is 
very difficult to be sustained when the complexity of ACP 
increases, usually coupled by an increase in complexity of 
databases schemas. 
2) Programmers who use CuSS are free to write any 
CRUD expression opening a security gap. CRUD 
expressions may be in compliance with the formalized ACP 
but violating security rules that are not possible to be 
formalized. ACP are suited to control the access to schema 
objects but not to control the information SQL statements 
may get from them. If a user has the permission to, for 
example, read a set of columns from one or more tables, it is 
not possible to prevent any SQL statement from reading that 
data. Select statements may select raw data or may use 
aggregate functions, for example, to select critical statistical 
information, opening a possible security gap. 
 3) Whenever ACP are updated, the correspondent access 
control mechanisms have to be updated in advance. There is 
no way to automatically translate ACP into access control 
mechanisms of CuSS.  
4) Some ACP need to be hard-coded to manage runtime 
constraints. There is no way to automatically update these 
scattered and hidden hard-coded access control mechanisms 
in current CuSS.  
To tackle the aforementioned drawbacks we propose a 
new architecture for CuSS, herein referred to as Access 
Control-driven Architecture with Dynamic Adaptation 
(ACADA). Software solutions cease to be of general use and 
become specialized solutions to address specific business 
areas, such as accountability, warehouse and customers. 
They are automatically built from a business architectural 
model, enforcing ACP defined by a security expert. ACP are 
statically enforced by typed objects driven by schemas of 
Create, Read, Update and Delete (CRUD) expressions. Then, 
CRUD expressions are deployed at runtime in accordance 
with the established ACP. Any modification in the ACP is 
followed by an adaptation process to keep access control 
mechanisms aligned with the policies to be enforced. A proof 
of concept based on Java, JDBC [9] and SQL Server 2008 is 
also presented. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II presents the 
motivation and related word; section III presents the 
proposed approach; section IV presents a proof of concept 
and, finally, section V presents the final conclusion. 
II. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK 
CuSS have been devised to improve the development 
process of business logic mainly for tackling the impedance 
mismatch [16]. From them, two categories have had a wide 
acceptance in the academic and commercial forums: 1) 
Object-to-Relational mapping (O/RM) tools [19, 20] (LINQ 
[12], Hibernate [13], Java Persistent API (JPA) [11], Oracle 
TopLink [21], CRUD on Rails [15]) and 2) Low Level API 
(JDBC [9], OBDC [10], ADO.NET [14]). Other solutions, 
such as  embedded SQL [22] (SQLJ [23]), have achieved 
some acceptance in the past. Others were proposed but 
without any general known acceptance: Safe Query Objects 
[24] and SQL DOM [25].  
Listing 1 shows the usage of four CuSS (JDBC, 
ADO.NET, JPA and LINQ) for updating the attribute 
totalValue returned by the query “select clientId, ttlValue 
from Orders where date=2012-01-31”. Programmers are 
completely free to edit any CRUD expression (CRUD 
expressions are encoded inside strings), to execute it (line 2, 
9, 20, 27) and to update the attribute ttlValue (line 4-5, 14-
16, 21-24, 28-29). There is no sign of any ACP: neither for 
the CRUD expression being executed nor for the updated 
attribute. Beyond updating totalValue, nothing prevents 
programmers from writing source code to update any other 
attribute. Programmers have no guidance either on the 
established ACP or on the underlying database schema. Only 
after writing and running the source code, programmers 
become aware of any ACP violation or any database schema 
nonconformity.  Moreover, this   same  source  code  may  be 
 
 1 // JDBC - Java 
 2 rs=st.executeQuery(sql); 
 3 rs.next(); 
 4 rs.updateFloat(“ttlValue”, newValue); 
 5 rs.updateRow(); 
 6  
 7 //ADO.NET – C# 
 8 SqlDataAdapter da=new SqlDataAdapter(); 
 9  da.SelectCommand=new SqlCommand(sql,conn); 
10  SqlCommandBuilder cb=new SqlCommandBuilder(da); 
11 DataSet ds=new DataSet(); 
12 da.Fill(ds,"Orders"); 
13 DataRow dr=ds.Tables["Orders"].Rows[0]; 
14 dr["ttlValue"]=totalValue; 
15 cb.GetUpdateCommand(); 
16 da.Update(ds,"Orders"); 
17 
18 // JPA - Java 
19 Query qry=em.createNamedQuery(sql,Orders.class); 
20 Orders o=(Orders)qry.getSingleResult(); 
21 em.getTransaction().begin(); 
22 o.setTtlValue(value); 
23 em.persist(o); 
24 em.getTransaction().commit(); 
25 
26 //LINQ – C# 
27 Order ord=(from o in Orders select o).Single();  
28 ord.ttlValue=value; 
29 db.SubmitChanges(); 
Listing 1. Examples using CuSS 
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select o.clientId,SUM(o.ttlValue) as ttlValue 
 from Orders as o 
 where o.date between '2012-01-01' and '2012-01-31' 
group by o.clientId 
order by o.clientId desc 
Listing 2. CRUD expression with aggregate function. 
used to execute an infinite number of different CRUD 
expressions requiring the same ACP, such as the one shown 
in Listing 2. There is no way to avoid this type of security 
violation. Even if a PEP was used, it would not solve any of 
the hurdles previously presented. An example of the need for 
evolving ACP, is the designation of a secretary Susanne to be 
temporally allowed to update clients’ ttlValue. Her role has 
to be changed but roles of other secretaries are to be kept 
unchanged. ACP foresee this possibility by using the 
delegation concept. The problem is the lack of preparedness 
of CuSS to accommodate this situation. Source-code needs 
to be   modified   to   accommodate the   new permission   for 
Susanne. The situation will further deteriorate if the 
permission is to be only granted while she is within the 
facilities of the company. The use of hard-coded mechanisms 
to enforce ACP entails maintenance activities on source-code 
of client-side components of database applications whenever 
ACP evolve. CuSS and current access control mechanisms 
are not prepared to seamlessly accommodate and enforce 
these evolving ACP. 
To address these issues several solutions have been 
proposed. 
SELINKS [18] is a programming language in the type of 
LINQ and Ruby on Rails which extends Links [26]. Security 
policies are coded as user-defined functions on DBMS. 
Through a type system named as Fable, it is assured that 
sensitive data is never accessed directly without first 
consulting the appropriate policy enforcement function. 
Policy functions, running in a remote server, check at 
runtime what type of actions users are granted to perform, 
basically controlling more efficiently what RDBMS are 
currently able to do, and this way not tackling the need to 
master ACP and database schemas. Moreover, if ACP evolve 
there will be no way to automatically accommodate the 
modifications in the client-side components. 
Jif [27] extends Java with support for information access 
control and also for information flow control. The access 
control is assured by adding labels that express ACP. Jif 
addresses some relevant aspects such as the enforcement of 
security policies at compile time and at runtime. Anyway, at 
development time programmers will only be aware of 
inconsistencies after running the Jif compiler. In spite of its 
valuable contribution, Jif does not address the announced 
goals of this research. 
Rizvi et al. [28] uses views to filter contents of tables and 
simultaneously to infer and check at runtime the appropriate 
authorization to execute any query. The process is 
transparent for users and queries are rejected if they do not 
have the appropriate authorization. This approach has some 
disadvantages: 1) the inference rules are complex and time 
consuming; 2) security enforcement is transparent, so users 
do not know that their queries are run against views; 3) 
programmers cannot statically check the correctness of 
queries which means they are not aware of either the ACP or 
the underlying database schema. 
Morin et al. [29] uses a security-driven model-based 
dynamic adaptation process to address simultaneously access 
control and software evolution. The approach begins by 
composing security meta-models (to describe access control 
policies) and architecture meta-models (to describe the 
application architecture). They also show how to map 
(statically and dynamically) security concepts into 
architectural concepts. This approach is mainly based on 
establishing bindings between components from different 
layers to enforce security policies. Authors didn´t address the 
key issue of how to statically incorporate the established 
security policies in software artifacts. 
Differential-privacy [30] has had significant attention 
from the research community. It is mainly focused on 
preserving privacy from statistical databases. It really does 
not directly address the point here under discussion. The 
interesting aspect is Frank McSherry’s [31] approach to 
address differential-privacy: PINQ - a LINQ extension. The 
key aspect is that the privacy guarantees are provided by 
PINQ itself not requiring any expertise to enforce privacy 
policies. PINQ provides the integrated declarative language 
(SQL like, from LINQ) and simultaneously provides native 
support for differential-privacy for the queries being written. 
III. ACADA: PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this section a new architecture, ACADA, is proposed 
for CuSS. We first introduce an overview for the proposed 
approach. Then we introduce some relevant aspects of CuSS 
from which ACADA will evolve. Then, CRUD Schemas are 
presented as key entities of ACADA. Finally, ACADA is 
presented. 
A. Overview 
ACADA is an architecture for software solutions used in 
business tiers of database applications. Each software 
solution derived from ACADA, herein known as Access 
Control-driven Component with Dynamic Adaptation  
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Figure 2. Proposed approach for the adaptation of ACCDA a) static 
composition and b) dynamic adaptation. 
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(ACCDA), is customized to address a specific need of a 
business area, such as accountability, warehouse and sales. 
Then, at runtime, they are dynamically adapted to be kept 
aligned with the established ACP. This approach combines a 
static composition of ACCDA and a dynamic adaptation to 
the running context as shown in Figure 2. During the static 
composition, Figure 2 a), static parts of ACP are used to 
build an ACCDA based on an architectural model 
(ACADA). Static parts of ACP comprise the information 
needed to build the business logic to manage CRUD 
expressions. Any modification in the static parts compels to a 
new static composition. During the dynamic adaptation, see 
Figure 2 b), CRUD expressions are dynamically assigned 
and unassigned to running ACCDA in accordance with ACP 
defined for each user. This process is continuous and may 
have as input data from a monitoring framework and from 
security experts. Security experts modify ACP, for example, 
to allow secretary Susanne to update clients’ ttlValue and, 
therefore, to use the necessary business logic and necessary 
CRUD expressions. Monitoring framework updates ACP, for 
example, only to allow Susanne to update clients’ ttlValue 
while she is within the facilities of the company. 
B. Relevant Aspects of CuSS 
To proceed with a more detailed presentation it is 
advisable to learn and understand CuSS and the context in 
which CRUD expressions are executed. Identifying a 
common base for current approaches is a key aspect to 
devise ACADA. The following shared functionalities are 
emphasized: 
1) To promote reusability of CRUD expressions, 
parameters may be used to define runtime values. Parameters 
are mainly used to define runtime values for clause 
conditions and for column lists. Listing 3 shows an Update 
CRUD expression with four parameters: a, b and c are 
columns and d is a condition. 
 
update table set a=?, b=?, c=? where d=? 
Listing 3. CRUD expression with parameters. 
 
 2) If CRUD expression type is Insert, Update or Delete, 
its execution returns a value indicating the number of 
affected rows. 
3) Data returned by CRUD expressions of type Select is 
managed by a local memory structure (LMS) internally 
created by CuSS. Some LMS are readable only and others 
are readable and modifiable. Modifiable LMS provide 
additional functionalities to modify their internal content: 
update data, delete data and insert new data. These actions, 
are equivalent to CRUD expressions and the results are 
committed into the host RDBMS. 
Thus, CRUD expressions are used at two levels: at the 
application level and at the LMS level. At the application 
level CRUD expressions are explicitly used, while at the 
LMS level CRUD expressions are implicitly used. In both 
cases, to guarantee compliance with established ACP and 
with database schemas, CRUD expressions need to be 
emanated from the established ACP and from database 
schemas and not from programmers’ will. In reality, CRUD 
expressions and LMS are the key assets of CuSS to interact 
with RDBMS. They are the entities used to read data from 
databases and to alter the state of databases. 
C. Crud Schemas 
CRUD expressions and LMS are two key entities of 
ACADA. They are the entities used to interact with 
databases and, therefore, the privileged entities through 
which ACP may be enforced. To this end, ACADA 
formalizes CRUD expressions and LMS using a schema 
herein known as CRUD schema. A CRUD schema is a set of 
services needed to manage the execution of CRUD 
expressions and the associated LMS (only for Select CRUD 
expressions). It comprises four independent parts: a) a 
mandatory type schema – the CRUD type - query (Select) or 
execute (Insert, Update or Delete); b) an optional parameter 
schema – to set the runtime values for the conditions used 
inside SQL clauses, such as the “where” and “having” 
clauses and runtime values for column lists (only for Insert 
and Update CRUD expressions); c)  mandatory result 
schema for Insert, Update and Delete CRUD expressions – to 
handle the number of affected rows during the CRUD 
expressions execution and, finally, d) a mandatory LMS 
schema for Select CRUD expressions – to manage the 
permissions on the LMS. 
Table I shows a possible definition for the permissions on 
an LMS derived from the CRUD expression Select a,b,c,d,e 
from table. This access matrix [32] like representation, 
defines for each attribute of this LMS, which LMS 
functionalities (read, update, insert, delete) are authorized. 
delete action is authorized in a tuple basis and, therefore, it is 
executed as an atomic action for all attributes.  
 
TABLE I. TABLE OF PERMISSIONS IN A LMS 
 a b c d 
Read yes no yes yes 
Update no yes no yes 
Insert yes yes no no 
delete yes 
 
 
D. ACADA Presentation 
Figure 3 presents a class diagram for an ACADA model, 
for building ACCDA. Figure 3 a) presents the entities used to 
define CRUD schemas. Figure 3 b) presents the final class 
diagram of ACADA. There are six types of entities: ILMS, 
ICrudSchema, Manager, IFactory, IConfig and CrudSchema: 
ILMS (used for Select CRUD expressions only) defines 
the permissions on LMS, following the approach presented 
inTable I: IRead defines the readable attributes, IUpdate 
defines the updatable attributes, IInsert defines the  insertable 
attributes and IDelete defines if  LMS’s  rows  are  deletable. 
Aditionally, ILMS also uses IScroll to define the scrollable 
methods to be made available. 
ICrudSchema is used to model the business logic for each  
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#CrudSchema_n(in conn : Connection, in crud : string)
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+CrudSchema_1(in crudId : int) : ICrudSchema_1
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«interface»
IFactory
+getInstance(in username : string, in password : string, in url : string, in port : int) : IFactory
Manager
*
1
1 *
 
Figure 3. Class diagram for ACADA: a) entities used to define schemas of CUD expressions; b) final class diagram of ACADA. 
 
CRUD      schema      instance –   see     ICrudSchema_1, …, 
ICrudSchema_n, in Figure 3 b). It comprises a mandatory 
method, execute(param_1,…,param_n), to set the parameter 
schema and to execute CRUD expressions, and two optional 
interfaces: ILMS and IResult. IResult (for Insert, Update and 
Delete CRUD expressions only) implements the result 
schema. 
CrudSchema is used to implement ICrudSchema. The 
arguments conn and crud are a connection object to a 
database and the CRUD expression to be managed, 
respectively. Each CrudSchema is able to manage any 
CRUD expression with equivalent schema. CRUD 
expressions with the same CRUD Schema are herein known 
as sibling CRUD expressions. Listing 4 presents two simple 
sibling CRUD expressions: both are Select, both have the 
same select list, none has column list or condition list 
parameters. This property is an opportunity to extend the 
adaptation capability of ACADA. In practice each 
CrudSchema is able to manage an infinite number of sibling 
CRUD expressions. Thus, any CrudSchema used by UserA 
is able to manage not one CRUD expression but one set of 
sibling CRUD expressions and the same CrudSchema may 
be used by UserB to manage a different set of sibling CRUD 
expressions.  
 
Select * from table; 
Select * from table where id=10; 
Listing 4. 2 Sibling CRUD expressions. 
 Manager implements two interfaces (IFactory and 
IConfig) and is the entry point for creating instances of 
ACCDA (using getInstance, authentication is required). url 
and port are used to connect to a component responsible for 
the dynamic adaptation process and for the authentication of 
users. 
IConfig is used to dynamically adapt running instances of 
ACCDA to users previously authenticated. The dynamic 
process comprises the deployment of CRUD expressions and 
also the required information to set the connection to 
RDBMS (not shown). Each CRUD expression is assigned to 
a CrudSchema responsible for its management. IConfig is 
implemented using a socket to decouple ACCDA from 
components responsible for managing the dynamic 
adaptation process.  
 IFactory is used to create instances of   
CrudSchema.Users request the access to a CrudSchema and 
to a CRUD expression. The access is granted or denied 
depending on the ACP defined by the dynamic adaptation 
process. 
IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT 
In this section a proof of concept based on Java and 
JDBC (sqljdbc4) for SQL Server 2008, is presented. A 
component, herein known as ACEngine, was developed to 
automatically create releases of ACCDA. The biggest 
challenge was centered on the approach to be followed to 
formalize CRUD schemas to be used to define the target 
business area. Several approaches were considered, among 
them XML and standard Java interfaces. In spite of being 
less expressive than XML, Java interfaces proved to be an 
efficient and effective approach. Programmers do not need to 
use a different development environment, interfaces are basic 
entities of any object-oriented programming language and 
are widely used, interfaces are easily edited and maintained 
and, finally, CRUD schemas have also been defined as 
interfaces, see Figure 3. These were the fundamental reasons 
for having opted for Java interfaces in detriment of XML. 
ACEngine accepts as input, for each CRUD schema, one 
interface extending all the necessary interfaces as defined in 
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ICrudSchema and shown in Figure 3. Then, through 
reflection, ACEngine detects which interfaces are defined 
and which methods need to be implemented to automatically 
create the source code. 
A component for the dynamic adaptation process was 
also created. The main information is organized around 
users. For each user it is defined its authentication 
parameters (username and password), the assigned CRUD 
expressions and the correspondent CrudSchemas. Any 
modification in this information is immediately sent to users 
running ACCDA instances. 
The example to be presented is based on the Select and 
on the permissions used in Table I. 
Figure 4 shows the four interfaces used to formalize the 
LMS’s permissions, which are in agreement with Table I. 
CuSS use the same access methods for updating and for 
inserting attributes. This approach prevents the separation 
between update permissions and insert permissions. 
Therefore, to overcome this limitation, access methods of 
IUpdate and IInsert have been given different names. 
IUpdate use a prefix u and IInsert use a prefix i. Some 
additional methods, such as uUpdate() and iBeginInsert() are 
used to implement the update and insert protocols defined by 
JDBC for LMS. 
 
 
Figure 4. IRead, IUpdate, IInsert and IDelete interfaces. 
Figure 5 presents the usage of ACCDA from a 
programmer’s perspective. An attempt is done to create a 
new ACCDA instance (line 29). It will raise an exception if a 
connection to ACDynam fails or if authentication fails. 
Authentication is processed by ACDynam and if it   
succeeds, ACDynam transfers to ACCDA all the CRUD 
expressions, in accordance with the ACP assigned to the 
authenticated user. Then, an attempt is made to create an 
instance of a crudSchema for managing the CRUD 
expression identified by token 1 (line 30). As previously 
mentioned,   programmers  cannot  edit  CRUD  
expressions.They are only allowed to use CRUD expressions 
made available by ACDynam, overcoming this way the 
security  gap  of CuSS. If  it   fails   (user is  not authorized to  
 
 
Figure 5. ACCDA from the programmer’s perspective. 
 
execute the CRUD expression), an exception is raised. If not, 
CRUD expression is executed (line 31) and LMS is scrolled   
row by row (line 32). The dynamic adaptation is on behalf of 
ACDynam that, at any time, may modify the permission to 
use this CRUD expression. There is no need to update any 
source-code this way overcoming CuSS to be adapted to 
evolving ACP. The three readable attributes are read (line 
33-35). Update protocol is started (line 36). Auto-completion 
window (line 38-43) shows the available methods to update 
attributes of LMS, relieving programmers from mastering the 
established ACP and database schema. This type of guided-
assistance is available for all operations involving ACCDA, 
this way overcoming the need for mastering ACP and 
database schemas when using CuSS. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper a new architecture (ACADA) was presented 
to devise solutions driven by ACP and able to be 
dynamically adapted to deal with evolving ACP. The 
adaptation process of each ACCDA release is achieved in a 
two phase approach: static composition and dynamic 
adaptation. Static composition is triggered whenever a 
maintenance activity is necessary in CRUD Schemas. 
Dynamic adaptation is a continuous process where CRUD 
expressions are deployed to running ACCDA instances in 
accordance with ACP. ACP are dynamically updated by a 
monitoring framework and/or by security experts. 
Source code is automatically generated from an 
architectural model and from ACP defined by a security 
expert. In opposite to CuSS, programmers using ACCDA are 
relieved from mastering ACP and database schemas, and 
also from writing CRUD expressions. Security is ensured by 
preventing programmers from writing CRUD expressions 
and by controlling dynamically, at runtime, the set of CRUD 
expressions that each user may use. Evolving ACP are 
seamlessly supported and enforced by ACCDA. An 
independent and external component keeps the access control 
mechanisms of ACCDA updated at runtime by assigning and 
unassigning CRUD expressions. This adaptation capability 
of ACCDA avoids maintenance activities in the core client-
side components of database applications when ACP evolve. 
The adaptation capacity is significantly improved by 
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CrudSchema design which, theoretically, is able to manage 
an infinite number of sibling CRUD expressions. 
Summarizing, ACADA overcomes the four drawbacks of 
CuSS. This achievement is mostly grounded on its two phase 
adaptation process: static composition and dynamic 
adaptation.  
It is expected that this work may open new perspectives 
for enforcing evolving ACP in business tier components of 
database applications. 
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